DAILY TRIFECTA: NATO's Mission Creep

Attrition or subtraction

TITLE: Wounded Veterans, Wounded Economy: The Personnel Costs of Russia’s War
https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/wounded-veterans-wounded-economy-the-personnel-costs-of-russias-war/

EXCERPT: Holding aside the long-term implications of the personnel costs of the conflict, one has to appreciate how much the Russian state is currently spending to care for casualties. The one-time costs of compensating wounded and dead soldiers plus their families are very high, in no small part due to recent decrees that promise major payouts to incentivize volunteers. A law passed before the war entitles the family of a soldier who has been killed to 3.3 million rubles as an insurance payment from private insurers, and an additional 5 million rubles from the state. Wounded soldiers are entitled to 3 million rubles, as per a decree from the early days of the invasion of Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin has announced a separate 5 million ruble payment to families (this combines the previously mentioned 3 million ruble payout for injury with an additional 2 million in case of death). Every Russian oblast or province provides a separate payment of at least 1 million rubles, with some paying up to 3 million. Combining all of the above, the cost of payouts to the family of a soldier killed in Ukraine would come to at least 14 million rubles at the time of writing, excluding several smaller, long-term payments.

Based on open source estimates from the governments of France and the United Kingdom as of May 2024, the Russians have likely taken around 400,000 casualties, with over 100,000 of those dead. Simple math shows that one-time payments would equate to 900 billion rubles for wounded personnel and at least 1.4 trillion for families of the dead, 2.3 trillion rubles total. This equates to 6 percent of the 2024 budget, a truly staggering amount that will continue to climb.

Unfortunately for the Kremlin, it will not get off the hook with one-time expenses, at least if it wants to provide an adequate level of medical care for veterans. If anything, caring for wounded troops will be more difficult now than in the past; after Afghanistan and Chechnya, care was cheaper than today as the scope of treatment was narrower and the cost of medical equipment, drugs, and labor was lower. Physically, Russia’s wounded are returning with complex, long-term injuries. Russia’s deputy minister of labor himself reported that the majority of disabled veterans have at least one amputation.

Mental wounds may be even more daunting to treat. A 2022 study carried out by researchers from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs estimated that the total economic cost of post-traumatic stress disorder, society-wide, in the United States was $232 billion in 2018. Approximately 80 percent of those with post-traumatic stress were civilians, while 20 percent were servicemembers. The annual, per-person cost of post-traumatic stress disorder in military personnel and veterans was $25,700 per year, and the same figure was $18,640 per year for civilians. Adjusted for inflation, those same figures would be approximately $32,000 and $23,000 a year.

Applying this research to the Russian case, if we divide these costs by purchasing power parity, which compares different countries’ cost of living, we get an approximate estimate of the cost of post-traumatic stress disorder. The purchasing power parity modifier for Russia is roughly 2.2, meaning that goods and services worth $100 in the United States would cost roughly $45 in Russia. Using this, we estimate the yearly cost of treating a soldier with post-traumatic stress disorder in Russia to be approximately $15,000. Assuming the dollar-to-ruble exchange rate remains constant at 90 rubles to the dollar, this would be 1.35 million rubles per year, per individual. If one million soldiers end up serving in the invasion of Ukraine, 500,000 of them could reasonably be expected to acquire some sort of post-traumatic stress disorder based on historical estimates. If so, the estimated yearly cost to the Russian economy of post-traumatic stress disorder among Ukraine veterans would be over 660 billion rubles a year, roughly 2 percent of the 2024 budget.

Holding aside the staggering costs of treating veterans in Russia, there are also significant capacity issues that the Russians are woefully ill equipped to deal with. The number of hospitals in Russia has declined roughly 20 percent since 2012, and there are only 10 veterans’ hospitals in the country. The only one that focuses on psychological rehabilitation has just 32 beds. There will need to be a massive expansion of the Russian military hospital system, or the state risks the collapse of the medical system, particularly in poorer and more sparsely populated areas. It’s unclear where the money and personnel for such an expansion would come from. Yet, if the state does not disburse the required resources, then either Russian veterans or the citizenry will not get adequate medical care. There is no middle ground. Further, Russian policymakers seem unwilling to assess if post-traumatic stress disorder is even an issue, since, according to grassroots veteran organizations and veterans themselves, “no one tests veterans for psychological trauma” and “there are no rehabilitation programs.” Instead of funding central treatment centers, the Russian government is supposed to provide grants to support groups or various programs set up by former soldiers, yet funding is sparse.

The Kremlin ordered the creation of the “Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation” in June 2023, and the organization has reportedly opened branches in several regions, including St. Petersburg. Government claims that the foundation has helped thousands of people seem dubious, as only 3 percent of its budget is dedicated to actually treating psychological ailments. The total first quarterly budget for the foundation was a mere 1.3 billion rubles ($15–$20 million under current exchange rates), for what is supposedly a national organization.

Even when volunteers overcome funding challenges to care for veterans, additional roadblocks have been encountered. For example, there are cases where volunteer medical staff are not allowed into St. Petersburg hospitals, and volunteers must fight the government tooth and nail to distribute aid. This may be part of an attempt to limit the exposure of civilians to the real effects of Putin’s war.

TITLE: NATO’s Biggest Test Since the Cold War Is Still Ahead
https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/07/nato-summit-ukraine-russia-war

EXCERPT: Two and a half years into what has become a war of attrition, the outlook for Ukraine is grim. Last year’s optimistic forecasts about putting Russian forces in an untenable situation during the Ukrainian counteroffensive and forcing Putin to negotiate in earnest have not materialized. Despite intense fighting and massive losses by both sides, the line of contact remains today essentially where it was at the end of 2022. Ukraine’s armed forces have dug in and transitioned to a long-term defensive strategy. Such a strategy represents a fundamental change from President Volodymyr Zelensky’s long-standing goal of liberating all Russian-occupied territory. An open-ended stalemate is not a convincing theory of victory.

In contrast, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory is clear. Since his initial blitzkrieg plan collapsed, the Russian leader has bet on winning at attrition warfare against Ukraine. The Russian army is making incremental gains on the battlefield, but the main Russian action is against Ukrainian cities and towns, infrastructure, and the spirit of the people of Ukraine. Relentless Russian bombardment has resulted in the destruction of well over half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity. Western allies and partners are scrambling to provide Ukraine with as much air defense capability as they can get their hands on, but Russia appears to have no trouble getting more bombs and missiles to sustain its campaign. And the damage to Ukrainian infrastructure is already done and is unlikely to be repaired in the foreseeable future. Putin’s bet is brutally transparent and simple—in a war of attrition, the side that has more of everything wins. And Russia has more of everything, including time. Putin is under no pressure to end this war.

Since Russia’s war began—whether two and a half years ago or ten years ago when Russia launched its first assault on Ukraine and occupied Crimea—the North Atlantic alliance has not lived up to its pledge to, in the words of French President Emmanuel Macron, “do everything necessary to make sure Russia does not win this war.” The allies are shifting their focus to the long term. The United States, the UK, France, Germany, and other allies have signed long-term agreements to provide Ukraine with military support and training. NATO is setting up a new command, dedicated to supporting Ukraine, which will be staffed by some 700 personnel from various countries. This burst of activity is due to the allies’ desire to “Trump-proof” support for Ukraine in case the former U.S. president is elected again and acts on his promise to end the war in twenty-four hours by cutting off aid to Ukraine and forcing it to capitulate. But these long-term commitments are less than they appear to be. When NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg proposed setting up a €100 billion ($108 billion) multiyear fund to support Ukraine’s war effort, the allies balked at it. Ultimately—almost at the last minute, in time to have a deliverable for the summit—they made a conditional promise of €40 billion ($43 billion) for one year, rather than several years.

The bilateral security agreements that the United States, France, Germany, and other allies have signed with Ukraine are promises to provide it with weapons and training but not, contrary to what the term implies, promises to come to Ukraine’s rescue. The “bridge to membership” label the allies have attached to these promises is anything but that. NATO membership is not on the table for Ukraine at this anniversary summit and probably not in the foreseeable future. As long as Ukraine is at war with Russia, the allies are not willing to grant it membership, since that would mean going to war with Russia. U.S. President Joe Biden said last month in his TIME Magazine interview that he was “not prepared to support the NATOization of Ukraine.” 

TITLE: All eyes on Biden, but can they see how close we are to war?
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/biden-russia-ukraine/

EXCERPT: Initially, the Biden administration was firm in its refusal to send certain military assistance to Ukraine. For instance, President Biden said early on in the war that the U.S. would not send American M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine because they were too complex for Ukrainian troops to operate. But in January 2023, the Department of Defense announced it would be supplying the tanks to Ukraine after all.

Following this shift, in May 2023, President Biden had another change of heart regarding F-16 fighter jets. For months, the president and senior U.S. officials opposed sending the aircraft to Ukraine, citing their sophistication and the need for pilots to have a strong command of English. Nevertheless, President Biden last year yielded to pressure from President Zelensky and European allies and authorized the transfer of dozens of warplanes from Western allies. The U.S. is currently training Ukrainian pilots.

Similar reversals followed at every turn. Later, with the approval of cluster munitions, and then with long-range missiles, such as ATACMS.

More recently, and even more alarming, the president's reversals have expanded to include significant policy red lines beyond weaponry. First, he permitted Ukraine to use U.S. weapons to strike targets in Russia’s interior. This decision was a shocking escalatory move, which the president originally prohibited because it would get the U.S. more directly involved in the fight.

Second, administration officials said the president is considering lifting the ban on U.S. military contractors in Ukraine. The importance of this decision should not be understated. Historically, this action is the opening move towards the eventual deployment of U.S. soldiers to a foreign conflict.

There is no better example of this than our involvement in Vietnam. In the 1950s through the official beginning of the war, the initial American presence on the ground in Vietnam operated under the guise of civilian advisers. Their mission was to provide military aid and advice first to French colonial forces fighting the Viet Minh, then to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) after the French left. While these U.S. personnel were not officially in a combat role, they were there to offer logistical and technical support, training, and intelligence assistance.

This action eventually led to the deployment of U.S. service members. Our nation's involvement started in a limited, indirect capacity and then incrementally escalated over 20 years to include the deployment of combat forces in Vietnam.

Is there any reason to believe that if he opts to put contractors inside Ukraine, President Biden won't at some point succumb to the pressure and barrel through the final red line by deploying U.S. service members to Ukraine?

It would be a miscalculation to assume that Russia doesn’t see this, and every other red-line crossing, as direct U.S. participation in the war.

There is no more significant burden to bear in the White House than that of Commander-in-Chief. Yet, ours seems poised to blunder (perhaps willfully) into World War III.